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Day fines, so called because the amount of
the fine is tied to an offender's daily earnings, are common in some European and
South American countries; not so in the
United States, where fines have traditionally been based on the individual crime
rather than on the individual offender's
ability to pay.
But as American jurisprudence seeks alternatives in sentencing, day fines have been
.Jroposed as one promising area of experimentation. This Research in Brief describes the first day-fine experiment in
American courts, a National Institute of
Justice (NIJ) project planned and implemented between 1987 and 1989 in the
Criminal Court of Richmond County
(Staten Island), New York. 1 This joint
project of NIJ, the court, and the Vera
Institute of Justice was also supported by
the German Marshall Fund of the United
States and New York City's Office of the
Deputy Mayor for Public Safety.

An NIJ evaluation of this successful
implementation demonstrated that:
• The day-fine concept could be
implemented in a typical American
limited-jurisdiction court.
• Day fines could substitute for
fixed fines.
• Fine amounts were higher for affluent
offenders under the day-fine system.
• Overall revenues increased.
• High rates of collection could be sustained (and possibly improved) despite the
higher average day-fine amounts.

Evolution of day fines
Fines are an ancient and widely used penal
. measure, and noncustodial sanctions are
not new in American sentencing. What is
new is an increased enthusiasm for the

systematic incorporation of "intermediate
sanctions"2 into sentencing systems, primarily in response to pressing justice and
fiscal concerns. The financial implications
of getting tough on crime have spurred
interest in creating a graduated progression
of intermediate penalties.
Until recently, the fine was not a prominent intermediate penalty in the United
States because of deep skepticism among
American criminal justice professionals .
Skeptics doubted the ability of judges to
set fines in amounts large enough to punish
and deter while making the fines fair to
offenders with vastly different economic
circumstances. Doubters also questioned
the courts' ability to enforce and collect
such fines. 3
The skepticism is beginning to dissipate,
however, as more American courts explore
fining systems that systematically vary fine
amounts in relation to the means of the

From the Director
Fines, as a method of criminal punishment,
date to the beginnings of the criminal justice
system, commonly being applied when the
offense was not sufficiently serious to
warrant incarceration and the offender
presented no grave threat to the community.
One problem, however, with fines as punishment lies in the difficulty in making the
·
punishment fit the crime.
The National Institute of Justice (NIJ), the
research and development arm of the U.S.
Department of Justice, has studied the
application of fines as an alternative means

of punishment in appropriate situations and for
appropriate offenders. Research has shown
that determining what should be paid, what can
be paid, and what will be paid is never easy.
The Institute has recently explored a method of
imposing fines that is well established in several European countries and in South America.
These penalties, called "day fines," are employed following a logical method that first
determines the severity of the offense, then
applies units of punishment based on the
offender's daily wages-hence, "day fines."

This Research in Brief describes an evaluation of the first experiment in the United
States in implementing a day-fines system,
an NIJ pilot project on Staten Island, New
York, which took place between 1988 and
1990. As this Brief shows, this sentencing
alternative should prove valuable in other
jurisdiCtions as well.
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How Day Fines Work
The general concept is simple: determining the amoWlt of punishment to
be administered to an offender is
separated from a consideration of
how much money that offender must
pay. Judges determine how much
punishment an offender deserves;
this is then denominated in some unit
other than money. These punishment
units are translated into monetary
terms based on how much money the
offender makes per day.
Practically speaking, the day fine
approach consists of a simple, twostep process. First, the court uses a
"unit scale" or "benchmark" to sentence the offender to a certain number of day-fine units (for example,
15, 60, or 120 units) according to the
gravity of the offense and without
regard to income. To guide the
court's choices, benchmarks or unit
scales are typically developed by a
planning group of judges, prosecuting attorneys, and defense counselors
familiar with disposition patterns in a
court.
The value of each unit is then set at a
percentage of the offender's daily
income, and the total fine amount is
determined by simple multiplication.

offender as well as the severity of the
offense-systems with which some European courts have long experience.
The variable fine systems used in Europe
are typically called "day fines" because
some portion of an offender's daily income
is used to calculate the fine amount. This
differs greatly from the typical fixed flatfine system used in American courts (see
"How Day Fines Work," above). In setting
fine amounts, American judges generally
apply "going rates" or "tariffs" based upon
understandings (usually informal) that the
same or similar amounts are imposed
on all defendants convicted of similar
offenses.

Such tariff systems have limited the usefulness of the fine as an intermediate sanction
in the United States because tariffs tend to
be set to reflect the lowest common economic denominator of offenders coming
before the court. This practice depresses
fine amounts, diminishes the punitive
weight of fines for better-off offenders, and
constricts the range of offenses for which
judges view a fine as an appropriate sole
sanction.
Day fines, on the other hand, ensure the
routine imposition of fines that are proportionally punitive-based on the seriousness of the offense-and equitable for
offenders with differing means. 4

Implementation of the
day-fine experiment
In evaluating the implementation of the
day-fine system in Staten Island, NIJ's
researchers concluded that the program
was successfully initiated. 5 Judges were
able to obtain the offender income information they needed to set the fine amount
promptly without disrupting the rapid flow
of cases. Once trained to use the day-fine
workbook they had helped develop, judges
found the mechanics of computing a dayfine sentence simple. No practical or ideological opposition to the principle was
voiced by either prosecutors or defense
attorneys.
The sole implementation problem encountered was one the planners had anticipated:
Statutory fine maximums in New York
State are very low and have not increased
since 1965. In a significant number of
cases, the day-fine amounts calculated by
judges for more affluent offenders convicted of more serious violations exceeded
the statutory limit.
In these instances, the judge sentenced the
defendant to the statutory maximum but
recorded the day fine as calculated. This
established a record for later use in the
legislative process, where more widespread use of day fines in New York State
hinges on statutory changes to increase the
existing fine limits.

Goals of the evaluation
The evaluation tested the impact of day
fines on the court's sentencing patterns and
sought to determine:

2

e Whether the theoretical complexity of
the day fine or the burden of its two-stage
procedure decreased the use of fines.
• Whether the use of fines shifted from
one type of offense to another.
• Whether, on average, day-fine amounts
were higher than the previous fixed fines
and, if so, whether this had any negative
effect on the existing high collection rate.
• Whether the day fine alone or in concert
with new collection techniques had any
impact on collection outcomes.
In addition, the research developed a
model in an attempt to predict the sentences offenders would have received if
there had not been a day-fine option.
Analysis of this kind can provide a basis
for gauging the extent to which introducing
day fines displaces other types of sentences
or replaces existing fixed fines. 6

Evaluation design
The design chosen for this evaluation was
a before-and-after comparison of penalJaw felony and misdemeanor arrests disposed of in the Staten Island Criminal
Court both before the introduction of day
fines and during the day-fine project's pilot
year. The sample from before the experiment consisted of all penal-law cases disposed of before the start of the day-fine
pilot, from April I, 1987, through March
31, 1988; there were 4,461 cases in this
sample.7 The pilot-year sample consisted
of all cases disposed of during the pilot
year, from September 1, 1988, through
August 31, 1989; there were 4,883 cases
in this sample.8
During the pilot year, researchers also
tested the impact of new collection procedures introduced as part of the day-fine
program. Part of the Staten Island pilot
project was a new collection and supervision component that developed individualized collection schedules and stressed
prompt notification of payments due and
missed. This was in contrast to the conventional method of collection, in which cases
not fully paid at sentencing were continued
on the court calendar, with subsequent
hearings set infrequently and arrest warrants issued if offenders failed to appear.
To compare the effects of day fines without the new collection techniques, the
fixed-fine system with the new collection

techniques, and the new day fines in combination with the new collection techniques,9 day-fine cases were randomly
assigned to two groups after sentencing:
The "experimentals" were those day-fine
cases processed according to the experimental collection procedures; the "controls" were day-fine cases handled using
the collection process routinely administered by the court.
Comparisons of collections between
the day-fine experimentals and the preday-fine cases measured the effect of introducing new day-fines along with new collection techniques. Comparisons between
the "controls" and cases from the year
prior to the experiment measured the independent effect of introducing day-fine
sentences without the new collection procedures. Comparing collection outcomes
for the "experimentals" with the "controls"
measured the effect of the new collection
procedures alone.
A variety of analyses were performed.
Prior to any before-and-after comparisons
being made, the 2 years' samples were
compared with regard to arraignment
charge; the two samples were found to be
statistically equivalent given the mix of
cases coming into the court.

Impact on sentencing
Day fines were successfully introduced into routine sentencing in the
Staten Island court during the pilot
year.
The mechanics of imposing a day fine
consist of establishing the number of dayfine units based upon the offense and estimating the offender's net daily income and
number of dependents to calculate the
monetary value of each unit. This process
was neither too complex nor too timeconsuming to be applied routinely in a
relatively fast-paced criminal court. Twothirds of the fixed fines in penal law cases
were replaced by day fines during the pilot
year.
Those fixed fines assessed during the ,pilot
year were imposed by non-Staten Island
judges sitting temporarily as replacements
for vacationing or sick colleagues; these
judges had not been trained to use day
fines and, therefore, used the traditional
tariff system in setting fine amounts.

The introduction of day fines did not
appreciably affect judges' sentencing
decisions during the pilot year.
When prior conviction records and arraignment charges were controlled, overall sentencing patterns remained steady during
the year in which day fines were applied.
The only noticeable change in sentencing
patterns was a small increase in jail sentences for some drug cases, a change that
occurred during the height of the crack
cocaine epidemic in New York City.
Therefore, it appears safe to surmise that
the introduction of day fines did not create
this shift in sentencing.

After introduction of the day fine,
average fines imposed for penal law
offenses rose 25 percent.
Fines rose from $205.66 before the experiment to $257.85 during the year in which
the day fines were introduced. However, if
day fines had not been restrained by statutory maximum fine limitations, the average
fine during the pilot period would have
been $440.83-more than twice the average fixed fine amount ($205.66). Even if
these uncapped day fines were combined
with fixed fines imposed during the pilot
year, the overall average fine amount
would have risen 84 percent in the experimental year (table 1).

The total amount of the fines imposed by the court in penal law cases
increased by 14 percent during the
pilot year (from $82,060 to $93,856).
The impact of the day-fine system on total
fine revenue would have been even more
dramatic if day fines had not been constrained by statutory maximums. In the
absence of the caps, the total amount of
fines in the experimental year would have
been almost 50 percent higher than the
total amount actually ordered (rising from
$93,856 to $137,660). This would have
represented a 67-percent increase over the
total fine amount ordered the year before
the experiment (table 1). Using day fines
could potentially raise revenues, provided
that the higher rates did not inhibit collection of the fines.

As expected, there was more variation among individual fine amounts
when they were calculated using the
day-fine system.
3

The judges relied substantially less on
traditional tariffs and calculated day fines
with more gradations, many of which fell
above the statutory fine maximums. Furthermore, as seen in table 1, during the
pilot year the fines that fell between the
tariff points were, for the most part, day
fines.

Changes in collection rates
and patterns
The Staten Island pilot study demonstrated
that by taking into account an offender's
ability to pay when the fine amount is set,
the levied fine is collectible and proportionate to the severity of the offense.

Despite the substantial increase in
average fine amounts, introduction
of the day-fine system did not undermine the court's high collection
rates.
Introducing day fines into the Staten Island
court did not significantly alter collection
rates, despite substantially higher average
fines (table 2). In 85 percent of the dayfine experimental cases (those subject to
the new collection strategy and the day
fine) and in 71 percent of the day-fine
control cases (those disposed of using the
collection process routinely administered
by the court), the offender eventually paid
in full, compared to 76 percent of the fine
cases from the year before the experiment.
These differences are not statistically
significant.
However, when a comparison is made of
cases in which fined offenders paid nothing, it is apparent that the new collection
procedures significantly improved collection outcomes: Only 6 percent of day-fine
experimental cases resulted in no payment
at all, compared to 22 percent of cases
prior to the experiment and 26 percent of
day-fine control cases. And when full
payment was not made, some payment was
much more likely in the day-fine experimental cases than in the cases from before
the experiment or in the day-fine control
cases.
These data suggest that the higher average
fine amounts levied in the day-fine cases
did not make collection more difficult for
the court and that the new enforcement

Table 1. Comparison of Fine Amounts Levied in Pilot Year, Capped by Statutory Maximums and Uncapped
Uncapped

Capped
Day fines and
flat fines

Pre-day-fines
pilot

Day fines only

Day fines and
flat fines

Day fines only

n

%

n

%

n

%

%of
total*

n

%

n

1

0.3

1

0.3

1

0.4

100.0

1

0.3

$25

33

8.3

4

1.1

3

1.3

75.0

4

$26-49

-

-

4

1.1

4

1.7

100.0

$50

69

17.3

29

8.0

12

5.0

2

0.5

6

1.6

4

$75

34

8.5

15

4.1

$76-99

-

-

9

$100

78

19.5

1

/o

%of
total*

1

0.4

100.0

1.1

3

1.3

75.0

4

1.1

4

1.7

100.0

41.4

29

8.0

12

5.0

41.4

1.7

66.7

6

1.6

4

1.7

66.7

10

4.2

66.7

15

4.1

10

4.2

66.7

2.5

8

3.3

88.9

9

2.5

8

3.3

88.9

38

10.4

22

9.2

57.9

38

10.4

22

9.2

57.9

0.3

15

4.1

14

5.8

93.3

15

4.1

14

5.8

93.3

14

3.5

18

4.9

11

4.6

61.1

18

4.9

11

4.6

61.1

3

0.8

11

3.0

10

4.2

90.9

11

3.0

10

4.2

90.9

22

5.5

18

4.9

11

4.6

61.1

18

4.9

11

4.6

61.1

8

2.0

9

2.5

6

2.5

66.7

9

2.5

6

2.5

66.7:

79

19.8

124

34.0

84

35.0

67.7

56

15.4

16

6.7

28.6

8

2.0

12

3.3

8

3.3

66.7

37

10.2

33

13.8

89.2

22

5.5

22

6.0

12

5.0

54.5

17

4.7

7

2.9

41.2

4

1.0

7

1.9

6

2.5

85.7

37

10.2

36

15.0

97.3

$1,000

21

5.3

22

6.0

14

5.8

63.6

16

4.4

8

3.3

50.0

$1 ,001+

-

-

-

-

-

0.0

-

24

6.6

24

10.0

100.0

399

100.0

364

100.0

240

65.9

364

100.0

240

100.0

65.9

$1-24

$51-74

$101-149
$150
$151-199
$200
$201-249
$250
$251-499
$500
$501-999

Total
Total fines
ordered
Average

100.0

0

$82,060.55

$93,856.00

$61,994.00

$137,660.00

$105,798.00

$205.66

$257.85

$258.31

$378.19

$440.83

*This percentage was calculated, for each fine amount, by dividing the number of day fines of that amount by the total number of fines of
that amount, to determine what percentage were day fines.
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procedures independently improved collection rates.

While the introduction of day fines
did not diminish the court's success
in collecting fines, day fines did take
longer to collect than fiXed fines
prior to the experiment.
Day fines, both with and without the new
collection techniques, took longer to collect than the earlier tariff-only fines (table
2). This pattern was closely related to the
higher average day-fine amounts. The
mean number of days to full payment was
significantly fewer for fines before the
experiment (55 days) than for either the
day-fine experimentals (114 days) or controls (119 days). The longer collection
period for day fines is not surprising in
.light of the substantially higher average
fine amounts imposed.
Despite these higher fine amounts and
longer periods before payment, the use of
day fines, when coupled with the new
collection techniques, did not increase the
number of postsentence court appearances
during the enforcement period. As intended, the new collection techniques kept
tined cases off the court calendar until the
end of collection and enforcement activities. While fines before the experiment had
required an average of 1.96 postsentence
appearances, the day-fine experimentals
required 1.76 such appearances. However,
in day-fine cases in which the court's
conventional collection procedures were
used, the higher average fine amounts did
require more court appearances (2.66).
Thus, without the more individualized
collection techniques used in the pilot
program's experimental cases, day-fine
offenders were brought back to court for
nonpayment more frequently than either
the fine cases before the experiment or the
day-fine experimentals.

The day-fine program significantly
reduced the number of arrest warrants
issued for failure to appear at post·
sentence hearings.
The court issued fewer arrest warrants for
nonpaying day-fine experimentals who
failed to appear for scheduled court hearings. The day-fine experimental cases
averaged 0.26 warrants, in comparison to
the cases sentenced before the experiment
0.55 warrants) and day-fine controls

Table 2. Summary of Collection Rates, Collection Patterns, and
Enforcement Outcomes

---·

Fixed finesb

Day-fine
experimentalsc

Day-fine
controlsd

16%

8%

17%

22%

6%*

26%*

Percent partial payment

2%

9%*

3%*

Percent ever paid in full

76%

85%

71%

55

114*

119*

Mean number of total appearances•

1.96

1.76

2.66*

Mean number of warrants ordered•

.55

.26*

.83*

72%

37%*

49%*

Percent paid in full

76%

85%

71%

Percent absconded

11%

6%

14%

Resentenced or jailed

10%

6%

14%

3%

3%

1%

Percent paid in full at sentencing
Amount paid as percent of amount due:
Percent paid nothing

Mean number of days to full payment

Percent paid in full at 9 months•
Enforcement outcomes:

Unresolved

aThese variables reflect Information as of 9 months after sentence, thus controlling for the
followup time period. The other variables did not need to be so constructed because they
reflect information about the final case outcome. Thus, to have equal followup periods for
each year, 7-month subsets of each year were created , allowing for 17 to 23 months of
followup.
bFixed-fine cases were taken from the year before the pilot year.
cExperimentals are those cases that were subject to new collection procedures as
well as day fines.
dControls are those cases subject to standard collection procedures as well as day fines.
*Indicates comparisons, whether of fixed-fine cases vs. experimentals, fixed-fine vs.
controls, or experimentals vs. controls, in which p < .05.

(0.83), as shown in table 2. These data
suggest that when the old collection techniques were used in conjunction with day
fines, which were higher on average than
the fixed fines, the court did have to rely
more heavily on warrants to collect the
fines.
Despite significantly higher average fine
amounts and longer collection periods, day
fines were collected at rates as high as
those for the smaller fixed fines. For those
offenders who did not pay in full, significantly more day-fined offenders paid
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something as opposed to nothing. Thus,
jurisdictions that implement a day-fine
system can expect to successfully collect
the additional revenue associated with a
day-fine system.
Further, the new collection techniques
piloted in Staten Island could compensate
for the decreased collection and enforcement some jurisdictions might expect from
raising fine amounts. The individualized
collection strategy had the following advantages over the court's routine collection
procedures:

• More extended terms for payment of the
larger day fines.
• Fewer costly court appearances.
• Fewer warrants for nonappearance at
postsentence hearings.
Jurisdictions whose existing collection systems are similar to Staten Island's can expect collection rates to remain stable after
introducing a day-fine system of similar design. However, if jurisdictions experience
additional court appearances and warrants
as a result of the average higher fines generated by a day-fine system, they might
need to devote more resources to collection
efforts. Thus, shifting to individualized collection systems when introducing day fines
(a shift that ought to be financially feasible
because day fines are likely to generate
higher total fine revenues) would probably
be the best approach for other American
courts wishing to implement the day-fine
concept.

The relationship between
income and fine amount
Under the day-fine system, individual
income plays a greater role in determining the fine amount, even when
other factors are controlled.
As expected, various factors influence fine
amounts. These factors include the severity
of the arraignment charge, the offender's
income, and whether the penalty was a
fixed fine or a day fine. Fine amounts increased for more severe charges, for higher
individual income, and for day fines as
compared to fixed fines.
Further, income has more effect on fine
amount when the severity of the arraignment charge is controlled arid the statutory
maximums are set aside. But because the
effect of income level can be seen in fixedfine cases as well as in day-fine cases, it
appears that implementing the day-fine
pilot standardized and made explicit the
decisionmaking principles that were already in place. Under the day-fine system,
this "calculus" was explicit and systematic,
resulting in more uniform sentencing.

Low-income offenders were no better or worse at complying with dayfine sentences than with tariff-fine
sentences.
Similarly, offenders sentenced to high or
low day fines generally did as well paying the fines as those who received the
lower fixed fines before the experiment.
Although the average day-fine amounts
were higher, they were no more likely to
exceed any group of offenders' ability to
pay and did not disproportionately increase
the burdens on low-income offenders.
However, the numbers were too small
for significant testing, and this finding
needs to be confirmed through additional
research.

Conclusion
Through the introduction of day fines, it is
quite possible that judges have become
more comfortable with the imposition of
monetary penalties when the amounts
can be adjusted to individual cases and
circumstances.
With a means-based method for setting
fines, fairer punishments were meted out
without making the process of imposing
fines too difficult or time-consuming for
judges. Further, average fine amounts were
higher under the day-fine system without
undermining the court's collection rates.
The day-fine approach has the potential
added benefit of raising total collected fine
revenues. Using a two-step procedure to
set fine amounts so that they systematically
reflect the gravity of offenses and offenders' means eliminates most of the objections usually raised about use of monetary
penal sanctions. The door may now be
open to wider acceptance and use of monetary sanctions in the United States. Indeed, the results from Staten Island have
encouraged adaptation of the day-fine
concept in American jurisdictions outside
New York. 10
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Notes
1. The Staten Island Criminal Court is a lower
court-a trial court of limited jurisdiction.
2. Castle, M.N. 1991. "Alternative Sentencing:
Selling It to the Public," NIJ Research in
Action; MacKenzie, Doris L., and James M.
Shaw, "Inmate Adjustment and Change During
Shock Incarceration: the Impact of Correctional Boot Camp Programs," Justice Quarterly, 7, l(March 1990):125-150; Morris,
Norval, and Michael Tonry, 1990. Between
Prison and Probation-Intermediate Punishments in a Rational Sentencing System, New
York, Oxford University Press; Joan Petersilia,
and Susan Turner, 1990.1ntensive Supervision
for High-Risk Probationers: Findings From
Three California Experiments, Santa Monica,
RAND Corporation; Dennis Wagner, and
Christopher Baird, "Evaluation of Florida
Community Control Program," NIJ Research
in Brief, (forthcoming).
3. Hillsman, S.T. 1990. "Fines and Dayfines."
In M. Tonry and N. Morris (eds.), vol. 12,
Crime and Justice: A Review of Research.
Chicago, University of Chicago Press.

4. Greene, J. The Day-Fine System: A Tool for
Improving the Use of Economic Sanctions,
New York, Vera Institute of Justice, March
1992.
5. For more on implementation ofthe Staten
Island day-fine experiment, see Judith Greene,
"The Staten Island Day-Fine Experiment," Part
II of Day Fines in American Courts: The
Staten Island and Milwaukee Experiments, ed.
Douglas C. McDonald, Washington, D.C., NIJ
Issues and Practices, April1992.
6. Project planners focused on demonstrating
whether the day fine could be implemented and
substituted for fixed fines but did not, in this
first test of the idea, encourage the court to
displace other sentences with day fines.
7. Because imposition of statutory fine
minimums is required for the serious traffic
cases heard in this court (for example, driving
while intoxicated [DWI]), they were eliminated
from the research. Although theoretically
possible, it is more complicated to calculate
day fines for cases in which judges are required
to set a specific fixed amount. In this first
implementation attempt, it was not feasible to
address this more complex issue. This was a
necessary but unfortunate limitation of the pilot
because it is likely that a significant number of

'1WI offenders would be fined more than the
ittutory minimum (the typical tariff rate)
under a day-fine system.
8. This research sample differs by several
weeks from the sample of cases followed by
program operators/planners during the .pilot
year and discussed by Judith Greene in Day
Fines in American Courts, n. 5 above.

9. Because the new fining technique and the
new collection method were introduced
simultaneously, it was important to separate the
effects of each reform on collection outcomes.
10. Over the past several years, seven
jurisdictions began to implement day-fine
systems. Maricopa County in Arizona was the
first; the other six-four sites in Oregon and
one each in Iowa and Connecticut-are taking
part in a Bureau of Justice Assistance project
through which technical assistance is provided
to sites implementing day fines.
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